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 The Mighty Waves of Regulatory 
Reform: Regulatory Budgets and the 
Future of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
James Broughel* 
ABSTRACT 
In the past 70 or 80 years, there have been three “waves” of reforms to the process 
of creating and managing U.S. federal and state regulations. The first wave began 
in 1946 with the passage of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, after which 
states went on to pass and formalize their own administrative procedures. The 
second wave began decades later in the mid-1970s, ushering in the era of cost-
benefit analysis reforms for regulations. This article focuses on the third wave of 
regulatory reforms that appears to be sweeping the nation and includes a predic-
tion that the next wave may include a return to some unsettled issues from the 
past. 
 
The current wave consists of efforts to manage regulatory output under budget or 
inventory systems for regulations. States like Virginia and Idaho appear to be 
making the most significant headway as part of the current wave, although the 
federal government is engaged in a similar effort. The article next focuses on the 
future of regulatory reform, predicting that economists will revisit the theoretical 
foundations of cost-benefit analysis, the analytical tool used to evaluate regula-
tions and their effects. Although academia will need to play a constructive role in 
this process, the states and federal independent agencies could also play a role by 
experimenting with regulatory institutions and, indeed, experimenting with differ-
ent methods and modes of analysis. 
  
                                                          
* Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Broughel received his 
PhD in economics from George Mason University in 2017. He is also an adjunct professor in the law 
school at George Mason University. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern era of administratively-driven governance began during the Pro-
gressive Era but took its modern form during the New Deal period in the 1930s 
and early 1940s. In the 70 or 80 years that have elapsed since then, there have 
been three “waves” of reforms to the process of creating and managing U.S. fed-
eral and state regulations. The first wave began in 1946 with the passage of the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 This law set up a formal process 
by which federal regulatory agencies promulgate rules, including requirements for 
public participation before rules are finalized and judicial oversight of regulatory 
actions.2 After 1946, states went on to pass and formalize their own administrative 
procedures, usually in the form of an act that looked quite similar to the APA.3 
Solidifying these formal administrative procedures constituted the first wave of 
U.S. regulatory reforms. 
The second wave of reforms began decades later in the mid-1970s, continued 
on through the 1980s and, to some extent, continues today.4 This was, and is, the 
era of cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) reforms for regulations.5 In 1981, President 
Ronald Reagan issued an executive order that formally required executive branch 
regulatory agencies to adopt CBA for so-called “major regulations.”6 However, 
this kind of analysis had already been used less formally in the federal govern-
ment due to various executive orders and policies imposed by previous presi-
dents.7 In the years since Reagan’s executive order, the vast majority of states 
have adopted similar requirements regarding CBA for regulations, at least nomi-
nally.8 However, this state-level CBA tends to be fairly incomplete and not partic-
ularly sophisticated.9 
This article focuses on the third wave of regulatory reforms that is sweeping 
the nation and includes a prediction that the next wave may include a return to 
some unsettled issues from the past. The current wave consists of efforts to man-
age regulatory output under budget or inventory systems for regulations. These 
efforts often come under the heading of regulatory reduction or red tape reduction 
                                                          
 1. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 2. Id. 
 3. A list of years when states passed APA laws can be found in Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Rich-
ard G. Vanden Bergh, Protecting the Weak: Why (and When) States Adopt an Administrative Proce-
dure Act (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Haas School of Business, University of 
California at Berkeley). 
 4. For example, New Mexico did not require cost-benefit analysis until 2018. See Directing Boards, 
Commissions, and Agencies to Implement Rulemaking Reforms, N.M. Exec. Order No. 2018-055 
(Dec. 18, 2018). 
 5. On the use of cost-benefit analysis in the federal government prior to 1981, see Jim Tozzi, 
OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 
63 Admin. L. Rev. 37, at 39 (2011). 
 6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 7. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3 C.F.R. § 926 (1975); Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. § 
161 (1977); and Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1978). 
 8. JASON A. SCHWARTZ, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH REGULATORY REVIEW: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE RULEMAKING 126–40 (2010). 
 9. For example, a report by the Pew Foundation tracked cost-benefit analyses produced in the 
states, and none of the analyses deemed sophisticated enough to merit counting in the study were 
related to rulemaking, even though many states require regulatory CBA. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., 
STATES’ USE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: IMPROVING RESULTS FOR TAXPAYERS 16 (2013). 
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initiatives, but they also constitute efforts to measure, track, and control aggregate 
regulation levels. 
It seems likely that these reforms have been set up, at least in part, to address 
the slow economic growth the United States has been experiencing in recent 
years, which may be a result of the near-relentless growth of regulation over the 
last half-century. Part II of this article will place the current wave of regulatory 
reforms in the context of a period of slow economic growth coinciding with an 
ever-expanding regulatory state. 
Part III will focus on states like Virginia and Idaho that appear to be making 
the most significant headway as part of the current wave; however, the federal 
government is also engaged in a similar effort and other states, like Ohio, appear 
to be close behind. Because these efforts are ongoing, their permanence, durabil-
ity, and ultimate success remain unclear. But the sheer momentum behind such 
efforts makes them notable. The current wave of reforms is also largely a partisan 
effort, advanced by Republicans, which raises additional questions about the du-
rability of these reforms.10 It is worth noting, however, that the two previous 
waves of reforms also began as largely partisan efforts.11 If history is any guide, 
once these regulatory budgets are adopted, they may come to enjoy support from 
all sides of the political spectrum. 
Part IV of this article focuses on the future of regulatory reform. Although 
there are numerous ways in which regulatory policy could be improved, the focus 
here will be on revisiting the foundations of CBA, the analytical tool used to eval-
uate regulations and their impacts. While the implementation of this tool in regu-
latory policy constituted the second wave of regulatory reforms, as discussed 
above, critical methodological problems with CBA remain unresolved by econo-
mists and are likely to be revisited as part of the future push for reform.12 Address-
ing these problems will become increasingly urgent if CBA is to maintain a prom-
inent place in regulatory policy and maintain credibility among economists, poli-
cymakers, and, most importantly, the public. 
Although academia will need to play a constructive role in this process, the 
states and federal independent agencies could also play a role by experimenting 
with regulatory institutions and different methods and modes of analysis. Part V 
of this article will review several interesting state regulatory analysis structures 
that differ significantly from the federal structure, which other jurisdictions may 
wish to emulate as they consider how to set up systems to analyze, review, and 
manage regulations. Part VI concludes. 
                                                          
 10. This is especially true of executive-led efforts initiated by governors or the president, which 
could be reversed through simple executive action at a later time. By contrast, reforms initiated legisla-
tively are likely to have more permanence as they are harder to unwind. 
 11. For a description of the political atmosphere that surrounded the creation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, see McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 180, 182 (1999). 
For discussion of how CBA—a tool initially viewed as deregulatory in nature—came to be accepted 
by many progressives, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008). 
 12. The most obvious of which is that it is unclear what cost-benefit is measuring. 
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II. REGULATING IN AN ERA OF SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Before delving into the nitty-gritty of regulatory reform, it is worth highlight-
ing the importance of regulation and why excessive regulation in particular can be 
problematic. We live in an era of slow economic growth,13 at least relative to the 
20th century. The following table presents compound annual growth rates of real 
gross domestic product (“GDP”) and real GDP per capita in the United States for 
every decade since 1950.14 A decline is evident—the United States has experi-
enced slower growth in the two most recent decades relative to the second half of 
the 20th century in terms of both GDP and GDP per capita growth. 
Compound Annual Growth Rates, by Decade 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Real GDP 




1.80 2.96 2.09 2.35 2.19 0.80 1.50 
Note: Data in the “2010s” column are for the 2010–2018 period. Author’s calculations are based on 
data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Real Gross Domestic Product [GDPC1]” and “Real 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita [A939RX0Q048SBEA],” retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
 
Of course, GDP is not the same as human fulfillment.15 Some benefits of regula-
tion do not show up in GDP. Nonetheless, a rising GDP is a reflection of a na-
tion’s wealth increasing—more income is generated each year as national wealth 
increases—and more wealth is consistent with more opportunity, more jobs, and a 
better-educated and often healthier and safer workforce.16 Increased income may 
even be consistent with more happiness.17 GDP may not be a perfect measure of a 
nation’s prosperity, but it may very well be one of the best ones we currently 
have. 
Consider, for example, that if per capita income this century had continued to 
grow at the historical rate from the second half of the 20th century (2.28%), rather 
than at the rate at which it did grow (1.11%), GDP per capita would have been 
                                                          
 13. See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF 
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 2 (2016); see also TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: HOW 
AMERICA ATE ALL THE LOW-HANGING FRUIT OF MODERN HISTORY, GOT SICK, AND WILL 
(EVENTUALLY) FEEL BETTER (2011). 
 14. Gross domestic product is the dollar value of all final goods and services produced within a 
country’s borders in a single year. Per capita GDP, meanwhile, is simply GDP divided by the number 
of people in the population, which corresponds with a measure of the average income in a country 
during a particular year. “Real” GDP or GDP per capita simply refers to the fact that values have been 
adjusted for inflation to account for a changing price level across time. 
 15. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., MISMEASURING OUR LIVES: WHY GDP DOESN’T ADD UP 4 (2010). 
 16. Aaron Wildavsky, Richer Is Safer, 37 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 27 (1981). 
 17. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Subjective Well-Being and Income: Is There Any Evidence 
of Satiation? 103 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 598, 598 (2013). 
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$69,769 in 2018 instead of $56,717 (in 2012 dollars).18 This represents a differ-
ence of more than $13,000 for every individual in the United States. At some 
point, an economy that grows more quickly than another economy is so much 
richer in terms of wealth, technology, and opportunity that one can reasonably say 
that it is objectively better off in terms of human well-being.19 
A decline in economic growth is also evident at the state level during the first 
two decades of this century. For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (“BEA”), Missouri real GDP grew at a compound annual rate of 
0.9% from 2000 to 2010.20 From 2010 to 2017, the corresponding rate was just 
0.3% annually.21 
The noticeable slowdown in economic growth, at both the national level and 
the state level, is a major problem that should be a top concern for policymakers. 
Even seemingly small differences in growth rates—such as tenths of a percentage 
point—can add up to billions or even trillions of dollars over time because of the 
compounding nature of economic growth. A state growing by 1% per year (rough-
ly Missouri’s growth rate in 2017) will take about 70 years to double the size of its 
economy.22 If this rate can be increased to 2% annual growth (roughly the national 
rate in recent years), the doubling time falls to 35 years, which is half as long. In 
other words, by the end of a typical American life span, the economy would be 
double the size under the 2% growth scenario versus the 1% scenario. At 3% an-
nual growth, the doubling time falls to 24 years. At this rate, the economy could 
double three times in an ordinary American’s life span. The end result would be 
an economy that is four times larger at the end of an average American’s life than 
it would be under the 1% scenario.23 
It is difficult to conceive of what the U.S. economy would look like if it were 
two to four times as large as it is today; the benefits in terms of technology, 
wealth, and opportunity are likely to stretch the bounds of the imagination. Fur-
thermore, growth in the range of 3-4%, although ambitious, is not out of reach. 
Tennessee’s economy grew 2.8% in 2017, a rate nearly two percentage points 
higher than Missouri’s; Oregon’s economy grew 3.6% in 2017.24 
                                                          
 18. Author’s calculation based on U.S. Bureau Econ. Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product Per 
Capita, FRED, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA. 
 19. This is an important point because economists have long struggled with how to connect measur-
able variables like economic growth to human well-being. See, e.g., TYLER COWEN, STUBBORN 
ATTACHMENTS: A VISION FOR A SOCIETY OF FREE, PROSPEROUS, AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS 
(2018). 
 20. Missouri BEARFACTS, U.S. BEA (Sep. 2018), 
https://apps.bea.gov/regional/bearfacts/statebf.cfm. 
 21. U.S. Bureau Econ. Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product for Missouri, FRED, FED. RES. 
BANK ST. LOUIS (May 14, 2019), https://fred.stlouisfed 
.org/series/MORGSP. 
 22. See Missouri BEARFACTS, supra note 20; James Broughel, Small Differences in Growth Rates 
Matter for Illinois’s Future, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE MASON UNIV. (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/illinois-economic 
-growth. 
 23. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, life expectancy at birth was 78.6 
years in 2016. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
Health, United States, 2017, tbl.15 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/015.pdf. 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME: 
TENNESSEE (Sept. 25, 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, PER CAPITA 
PERSONAL INCOME: OREGON (Sept. 25, 2018). 
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At the same time that growth has been slowing, regulation has been increas-
ing. Over the last 70 years, federal regulation in the United States has increased 
dramatically by virtually every measure. According to the Office of the Federal 
Register, there were fewer than 10,000 pages in the U.S. Code of Federal Regula-
tions in 1950, compared with more than 185,000 in 2018.25 Regulatory agencies 
had 57,109 employees in 1960, compared with 277,163 in 2017.26 Regulator 
budgets have increased in real terms from $3 billion in 1960 to $58 billion in 2017 
(in 2009 dollars).27 In 1970, there were roughly 406,000 regulatory restrictions in 
the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations;28 by 2017 that number had risen to nearly 
1.09 million.29 
The states also have sizable regulatory codes. As of 2017, Missouri had 
113,000 regulatory restrictions on the books.30 Much of that regulation comes 
from just a handful of regulatory agencies, such as the state Department of Natural 
Resources; the Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional 
Registration; and the Department of Health and Senior Services.31 
These two trends—rising regulation and a slowdown in growth—are important 
because there is strong evidence that slower growth and higher levels of regulation 
are connected. Empirical academic research suggests that regulation slows eco-
nomic growth32 and negatively affects the factors that contribute to growth, such as 
investment, productivity, and innovation.33 Some progress has been made to reduce 
the buildup of unnecessary regulations at the state level in recent years (including 
in Missouri),34 and reforms at the federal level are also occurring.35 But these ef-
                                                          
 25. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS: CODE OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS TOTAL PAGES AND VOLUMES 1938-2018, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2019/07/pagesPublished2018-1.pdf (last visited May 3, 2019). 
 26. Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, Regulators’ Budget: More for Homeland Security, Less for 




 27. Id. 
 28. Regulatory restrictions are instances of the terms “shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” and 
“required.” 
 29. James Broughel & Jonathan Nelson, A Snapshot of California Regulation in 2019, MERCATUS 
CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/snapshot-california-regulation-2019. 
 30. James Broughel et al., MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., A Snapshot of Missouri 
Regulation in 2017, (July 12, 2017), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/snapshot-missouri-
regulation. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic 
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137, 137 (2013); Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regula-
tions 4 (Apr. 2016) (working paper) (on file with Mercatus Center at George Mason University); and 
Simeon Djankov et al., Regulation and Growth, 92 ECON. LETTERS 395, 395 (2006). 
 33. See Alberto Alesina et al., Regulation and Investment, 3 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 791, 791 (2005); 
Renaud Bourles et al., Do Product Market Regulations in Upstream Sectors Curb Productivity 
Growth? Panel Data Evidence for OECD Countries, 95 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1750, 1750 (2013); 
Chiara Franco et al., Product Market Regulation and Innovation Efficiency, 45 J. PRODUCTIVITY 
ANALYSIS 299, 299 (2016). 
 34. For example, the No Mo Red Tape initiative was a priority of the administration of Missouri 
Governor Eric Greitens. See Hailey Hofner, Greitens Program to ‘Cut Red Tape’ Produces Reviews of 
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forts may not be enough to return growth rates to historical levels. This is especial-
ly important with respect to federal regulations because the number of federal re-
quirements far exceeds state regulations.36 In some cases, a single federal agency 
targets tens of thousands of restrictions at state businesses all by itself, which can 
be more than all the restrictions found in an entire state’s regulatory code.37 As just 
one example, the Environmental Protection Agency is estimated to impose more 
than 80,000 restrictions on the chemical manufacturing industry alone,38 whereas 
some states, such as Montana, have as few as 60,000 restrictions in their rule-
books.39 
III. THE CURRENT WAVE OF REGULATORY REFORM: CUTTING RED 
TAPE WITH REGULATORY BUDGETS 
Given disappointing economic growth in recent years, combined with the 
empirical observation that regulation has been increasing for decades (both of 
which were described in Part II), it is not surprising that governments are looking 
to regulatory reform to boost growth. Researchers at the Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University have estimated that federal regulation is slowing na-
tional economic growth by about 0.8 percentage points a year.40 Lowering growth 
by a little under one percentage point may not sound significant. However, it 
means that, had regulation levels been capped in the United States in 1980,41 2012 
GDP would have been $4 trillion larger, amounting to $13,000 in extra income 
for each American. 
Other studies estimate even larger effects than this,42 and state regulations are 
an added burden layered on top of the one imposed by the federal regulatory 
scheme. State and federal governments continue to struggle to rein in the explo-
sive growth of the administrative state over the last 70-plus years, but two states’ 
efforts in particular are worth highlighting for their innovative attempts to curb 
regulatory growth: Virginia and Idaho. 
                                                          
 35. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 36. See State RegData, QUANTGOV, http://www.quantgov.org/state-regdata (last visited Oct. 14, 
2019); see also Broughel and Nelson, supra note 29. 
 37. See State RegData, QUANTGOV, http://www.quantgov.org/state-regdata (last visited Oct. 14, 
2019; see also RegData U.S., QUANTGOV, https://quantgov.org/regdata-us/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
 38. See Federal Regulation and State Enterprise Index: Missouri, QUANTGOV 2–3, 
https://quantgov.org/50states 
/missouri/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2019). 
 39. James Broughel, A Snapshot of Montana Regulation in 2019,  MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE 
MASON UNIV. (May 2, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/snapshot-montana-
regulation-2019. 
 40. Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of Regulations, supra note 32. 
 41. Note that capping regulation at a particular year’s level is not the same as no new regulation 
after that year. New regulation would be allowed, but old regulations would have to be removed to 
allow for new regulations. 
 42. For example, Dawson and Seater estimate that GDP in 2011 would have been $39 trillion larger 
had regulation been capped at 1949 levels. See Dawson & Seater, supra note 32, at 160. 
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A. Virginia 
In 2018, Virginia passed the Regulatory Reduction Pilot Program 
(“RRPP”).43 This legislation was quite remarkable for two reasons. First, in an era 
generally known for political polarization, it passed with overwhelming bipartisan 
support.44 The final bill sailed nearly unanimously through a legislature narrowly 
controlled by Republicans and was signed into law by Governor Ralph Northam, a 
Democrat.45 Second, the RRPP created one of the first state regulatory budgets in 
the United States.46 
Virginia’s new law likely achieved such consensus because its initial focus is 
on cutting occupational licensing requirements, a form of regulation that both 
liberals and conservatives tend to disfavor.47 There is widespread agreement 
among economists in particular that licensing regulations often limit upward mo-
bility, harm traditionally disadvantaged groups, and stifle competition.48 Further-
more, by focusing reform on occupational licensing in general, rather than on 
specific professions’ licenses, the effort may face less concentrated opposition 
from regulated professionals, who often hinder such reforms.49 
The Virginia law includes several key elements. First, it tasks two state agen-
cies—the Department of Criminal Justice Services and the Department of Profes-
sional and Occupational Regulation—with producing a baseline count of their 
regulations and regulatory requirements.50 This process establishes an inventory of 
the agencies’ requirements. As of late 2018, the agencies began reporting their 
counts, finding 6,226 requirements between them.51 Roughly 80% of these are 
discretionary, meaning the requirements are not required by law, so the relevant 
                                                          
 43. H.B. 883, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
 44. James Broughel, A Reform That Offers Hope for Centrists, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2018/03/14/a-reform-that-offers-
hope-for-centrists/. 
 45. The bill passed 40 Yea votes to 0 Nays in the Senate and 96 to 3 in the House. Votes: VA 
HB833, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/VA/votes/HB883/2018 (last visited May 14, 2019). 
 46. The federal government has also been experimenting with regulatory budgeting. See Exec. Order 
No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 47. James Broughel, Licensing, Justice Reform Will Aid Virginia’s Poorest, CHARLOTTESVILLE 
DAILY PROGRESS (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.dailyprogress.com/opinion/opinion-commentary-
licensing-justice-reform-will-aid-virginia-s-poorest/article_50fb837e-2ed5-11e8-98b9-
b32062f3608d.html. 
 48. See WILLIAM MELLOR & DICK M. CARPENTER II, BOTTLENECKERS: GAMING THE GOVERNMENT 
FOR POWER AND PRIVATE PROFIT xi (2016); U.S. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, DEPTS. OF 
TREASURY & LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (July 2015); 
Matthew D. Mitchell, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., Occupational Licensing and the 
Poor and Disadvantaged (Sept. 2017), https://www.mercatus.org 
/publications/study-american-capitalism/occupational-licensing-and-poor-and-disadvantaged; Patrick 
A. McLaughlin et al., MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., The Effects of Occupational Licen-
sure on Competition, Consumers, and the Workforce (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/study-american-capitalism 
/effects-occupational-licensure-competition-consumers-and. 
 49. For example, many occupational licensing requirements exist to protect established interests 
rather than to serve the public interest. See MELLOR & CARPENTER, supra note 48. 
 50. H.B. 883, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
 51. See Letter from Aubrey L. Layne Jr., Va. Sec’y of Fin., to Members of the Va. House of Dele-
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agency has the ability to remove them.52 Of the 4,947 discretionary requirements, 
the agencies are required to cut 25% of them.53 This amounts to roughly 1,200 
requirements that the agencies must eliminate by the end of 2021. If they fail to 
achieve the reduction, alternative measures will be considered; for example, the 
implementation of a policy that mandates the repeal, replace, or streamlining of 
two requirements for every one requirement added.54 
Perhaps more importantly, by July 1, 2020, all executive branch agencies sub-
ject to the state Administrative Process Act will have to produce a baseline regula-
tory catalog and report their catalog data.55 At that point, it is quite possible that 
the pilot program will be expanded to other, and perhaps even all, state regulatory 
agencies. It remains unclear whether reporting will continue beyond the pilot 
phase or whether additional reductions will be required beyond the two initial 
pilot agencies. However, if the Virginia reform is successful at meeting the reduc-
tion targets—and it seems to be on track so far—while also maintaining high lev-
els of public health and safety, it seems likely the new regulatory budget could 
become a permanent feature of Virginia’s regulatory process. 
Notably, in 2018, CNBC named Virginia one of America’s best states for 
business, citing the new regulatory reduction law as a major reason for Virginia’s 
strong improvement in the rankings from the previous year.56 Given this positive 
response from the media, it is not surprising that other states are considering emu-
lating Virginia’s reforms.57 For example, Ohio passed legislation in 2019 that, like 
Virginia, would create an inventory of regulatory restrictions across state depart-
ments, and added an additional mandate that two or more restrictions be removed 
for each new one added until mid-2023.58 
B. Idaho 
Idaho is also in the early stages of enacting a regulatory budget. Shortly after 
taking office in January of 2019, Governor Brad Little made regulatory reform 
one of his top priorities by signing two executive orders targeting regulatory bur-
dens.59 Little’s Executive Order 2019-02 established a policy whereby for each 
new regulation added, two have to be identified for elimination or significant sim-
                                                          
 52. Id. at 1. 
 53. Technically, the law requires agencies to identify discretionary and nondiscretionary require-
ments, and the reduction target of 25 percent is set based on the overall count. In practice, the two 
agencies have set the reduction goal based on discretionary requirements only. H.B. 883, 2018 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Jeff Clabaugh, Virginia Ranks 4th Among CNBC’s Best States for Business, WTOP (Jul. 10, 
2018), https://wtop.com/business-finance/2018/07/virginia-ranks-no-4-on-cnbcs-best-states-for-
business/. 
 57. See H.B. 995, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019). The Pennsylvania bill, known as the Fighting 
Chance Act, is modeled after Virginia’s regulatory reforms. 
 58. See H.B. 166, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 121.95(F) (Ohio 2019). 
 59. See Governor Little Signs Two New Executive Orders Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Idaho-
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plification.60 As in Virginia, policymakers in Idaho are also estimating a baseline 
count of regulations. The order identifies a total of 8,200 pages and 72,000 re-
strictions in the Idaho Administrative Code.61 These estimates provide a bench-
mark against which future cuts in regulation can be measured. The order also es-
tablishes clear lines of responsibility, designating rules-review officers within 
state agencies and tasking the state Division of Financial Management (“DFM”) 
with regular reporting on the effort.62 Presumably, the DFM will also review 
agency rules and repeal activity before rules are formally proposed, thereby ensur-
ing that the one-in, two-out policy is followed. 
Signed on the same day as Executive Order 2019-02, Executive Order 2019-
01 implemented occupational licensing reforms by establishing sunrise and sunset 
reviews for Idaho state licenses.63 The actions of both Virginia and Idaho highlight 
how states sometimes pair specific targeted regulatory reforms, like occupational 
licensing or criminal justice reform, with broader regulatory process reforms like 
regulatory budgets. Such piggybacking of broad-based regulatory reforms with 
consensus reforms may be a wise strategy. It suggests that relatively uncontrover-
sial reforms may be a useful launching pad for more general reforms that may be 
perceived as somewhat controversial on their own. Kicking off broader reforms 
with pilot programs may also help produce new knowledge by allowing experi-
mentation to occur before reforms are implemented more broadly. 
Several elements of Idaho’s reform effort are notable, as they have been iden-
tified as critical to the success of regulatory reduction efforts in other jurisdic-
tions—most notably in Canada.64 These elements include a baseline count of the 
total amount of regulations in place, a process by which to achieve a meaningful 
reduction (one in, two out), oversight mechanisms, and regular reporting.65 
Interestingly, due to the somewhat unusual regulatory process in Idaho, Gov-
ernor Little was also given a unique opportunity to replace the entire Idaho Ad-
ministrative Code with a new version more to his administration’s liking. The 
Idaho legislature is required to pass a rule reauthorization bill each year, or else all 
regulations in its code expire.66 The legislature failed to pass the bill when it ended 
its session in April of 2019.67 Therefore, all regulations on the books were set to 
expire on July 1, 2019 unless passed as emergency regulations. This opportunity 
                                                          
 60. Alternatively, the agency will have to explain why this is impossible. See Idaho, Exec. Order No. 
2019-02 (Jan. 21, 2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/74/2019/01/eo-2019-02.pdf. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Idaho, Exec. Order No. 2019-01 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites 
/74/2019/01/eo-2019-01.pdf. 
 64. Laura Jones, Cutting Red Tape in Canada: A Regulatory Reform Model for the United States?, 
MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/cutting-red-tape-canada-regulatory-reform-model-
united-states. 
 65. See James Broughel, A Step-by-Step Guide to Using Mercatus Tools to Reduce State Regulation 
Levels, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/reduce-state-regulations-with-mercatus-tools; James Broughel 
& Laura Jones, Effective Regulatory Reform: What the United States Can Learn from British Columbia 
MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/effective-regulatory-reform. 
 66. Idaho Code § 67-5292 (2019). 
 67. Keith Ridler, Idaho Governor has Unfettered Chance to Cut State Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(April 17, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/3c58858586d9454bbe53a575f2bb82c0. 
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allowed the administration to effectively repeal and replace the entire Idaho Ad-
ministrative Code. 
Before the Idaho legislature opted to let the state code expire, the Little ad-
ministration had to justify any deregulatory action by issuing a new regulatory 
action.68 But with the entire code set to sunset, the administration had to justify 
any regulations that it wanted to keep by formally issuing a new rule, which re-
versed the burden of proof.69 The results are striking. At the end of June 2019, the 
Little administration announced it would allow 20% of all rule chapters and 900 
pages (out of 8,200) to expire on the July 1 deadline.70 As of July 2019, the ad-
ministration expected to eliminate or significantly simplify 55% to 60% of all 
state regulations by the end of the year.71 
This situation highlights the potential power of sunset provisions built into 
regulatory codes. Sunsets can not only return some accountability to the legisla-
ture by forcing lawmakers to vote on rules; sunsets can also be used to trigger 
retrospective review and evaluation of existing rules by forcing them back through 
the rulemaking process, to be justified anew. Another notable example comes 
from Rhode Island, a state that forced a regulatory reset by setting a one-time 
expiration date for its entire code, in this case for the purpose of moving rules to 
an online system and also as part of a streamlining effort.72 In the process, it elim-
inated 31% of the state’s rule volume.73 
The Idaho reform is truly innovative and should be watched closely going 
forward. While there is the danger that Idaho’s regulatory reset could unleash 
uncertainty in the marketplace, so far this does not appear to have happened. 
Meanwhile, the reform also has the potential to spur reductions in regulatory bur-
dens that would simply be unachievable in more conventional settings. 
C. Other Promising Efforts 
President Donald Trump’s administration has also been experimenting with a 
regulatory budget in recent years.74 The federal regulatory budget is more tradi-
tional than those the states are establishing because it relies on cost estimates.75 In 
other words, the administration allocates a limited amount of cost burden to agen-
cies each year, and they are not allowed to impose more than this amount on the 
public with their regulations. By contrast, the states mentioned above are limiting 
                                                          
 68. James Broughel, Idaho Repeals Its Regulatory Code, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON 
UNIV.: THE BRIDGE (May 9, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/idaho-repeals-its-
regulatory-code. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Press Release, Governor Brad Little, How Idaho Ushered In the Largest Regulatory Cuts in State 
History (Jun. 19, 2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/pressrelease/opinion-how-idaho-ushered-in-the-largest-
regulatory-cuts-in-state-history/. 
 71. Press Release, Governor Brad Little, Idaho Pursues Further Cuts to State Regulations (July 19, 
2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/pressrelease/idaho-pursues-further-cuts-to-state-regulations/. 
 72. See Press Release, Governor Marie Raimondo, Governor Signs Bill to Improve Rhode Island’s 
Regulatory Climate for Businesses (July 1, 2016), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/34428; S. 3015, 2016 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2016). 
 73. Press Release, Governor Marie Raimondo, Governor Raimondo Announces Largest Successful 
Regulatory Reform Effort in State History (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.ri.gov/press/view/34428. 
 74. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 75. Historically, placing limits on regulatory cost has been the traditional way regulatory budgets 
have been framed. See, e.g., S. 51, 96th Cong. (1979). 
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the number of regulatory requirements or restrictions agencies can impose. The 
federal regulatory budget is also an incremental budget, setting annual allowances 
for new regulations only,76 whereas the Virginia budget is based on regulatory 
totals, which is more comprehensive. 
In theory, basing agency allocations on regulatory cost makes sense because 
different individual restrictions or requirements could have vastly different eco-
nomic impacts. However, there are also limitations to relying on cost estimates, 
most notably the fact that so few regulations even have credible cost estimates.77 
Even when federal agencies attempt to estimate the costs of their regulations, their 
estimates can be compromised by political factors,78 or estimates may be inaccu-
rate, due to uncertainty or to the fact that certain costs, like opportunity costs, tend 
to be overlooked by agencies.79 Thus, the simpler regulatory budgets being im-
plemented in the states (some of which take a pay-as-you-go approach by requir-
ing that new regulations be offset by eliminating old ones) may be more practical, 
and even more efficient, than cost-based budgets. Despite any shortcomings with 
its approach, the Trump administration deserves credit for helping to usher in the 
current wave of regulatory budgets. It seems likely that, by making regulatory 
reform an early priority of his administration, President Trump has inspired and 
built momentum for similar state efforts. 
At least 20 states have initiated red tape reduction efforts since 2010.80 Some 
of them include elements of a regulatory budget by placing caps or limits on regu-
latory restrictions, requiring regulatory offsets, or setting reduction targets.81 
These have mostly been governor-led efforts, often initiated via an executive or-
der.82 Though none of these efforts to date have implemented a permanent, com-
prehensive state budgeting system for regulations, such a system may indeed be 
coming. Furthermore, the emphasis that governors are placing on measuring regu-
lations and on reducing regulatory burdens is notable, suggesting a pervasive 
sense that the United States is overregulated. The momentum behind the current 
wave of reforms may just be getting started. 
                                                          
 76. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM: REGULATORY BUDGET FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2018) (setting incremental annual cost allowances by federal department for fiscal 
year 2019). 
 77. Broughel & Jones, supra note 65. 
 78. Id. at 17. 
 79. James Broughel, OIRA Should Stop Calling a Tail a Leg, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON 
UNIV.: THE BRIDGE (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/oira-should-stop-
calling-tail-leg. 
 80. Justin D. Smith, Regulatory Reform at the State Level: A Guide for Cutting Red Tape in the 
Executive Branch, 3 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 270, 281-283 (2019). 
 81. For example, Idaho has imposed a one-in, two-out policy. See Idaho, Exec. Order No. 2019-02 
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://gov.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/74/2019/01/eo-2019-02.pdf. Governors 
in Missouri and Kentucky have set reduction targets in the range of 30 to 33 percent. See State Agen-
cies Still Considering Rules Cutbacks, JEFFERSON CITY NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.newstribune.com/news/local/story/2019/jan/14/state-agencies-still-considering-rules-
cutbacks/760979/; James Broughel, Tracking the Progress of Kentucky’s Red Tape Reduction Initia-
tive, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/tracking-progress-kentucky%E2%80%99s-red-tape-
reduction-initiative. 
 82. But not all. For example, Texas passed a one-in, one-out law in 2017. See H.B. 1290, 85th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2017). 
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IV. THE NEXT WAVE OF REGULATORY REFORM: REVISITING THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Although CBA is the dominant analytical framework for evaluating the po-
tential effects of regulations, the outputs of CBA are neither objective nor particu-
larly meaningful, as this section will explain. Considering that CBA has been 
applied to regulations for roughly 40 years, many may be surprised to learn that 
there is no consensus among economists as to what it actually measures.83 Some 
economists see the welfare measure underlying CBA as a form of economic effi-
ciency,84 formally known as Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.85 Other economists are not 
interested in this approach, largely because efficiency partially depends on the 
initial distribution of wealth in society.86 Critics of efficiency, who seem more 
concerned with the distribution of wealth than with the overall amount, base CBA 
on a mathematical function representing social welfare.87 
Strangely, neither the economic efficiency approach nor the social welfare 
approach actually measure what their proponents claim to measure. The problem 
with the social welfare approach, as demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow’s pathbreak-
ing impossibility theorem,88 is that under certain reasonable restrictions,89 it is 
mathematically impossible to aggregate individual preferences into a cumulative 
social welfare function.90 There are ways around Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
by relaxing the restrictive assumptions.91 For instance, if economists could map 
individual levels of consumption into units of cardinal utility,92 then a social wel-
                                                          
 83. The two dominant approaches to discounting in CBA are focused on different measures of 
welfare. See James Broughel, Three Approaches to the Social Discount Rate, MERCATUS CTR. AT 
GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Dec. 6, 2018), https:// 
www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/social-discount-rate. 
 84. For an example of an economist who prefers that CBA measure efficiency, see David Burgess, 
The Appropriate Measure of the Social Discount Rate and Its Role in the Analysis of Policies with 




 85. See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); see also J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. 
J. 696 (1939). 
 86. James Broughel, Equity or Efficiency? The Battle for the Soul of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 
MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Mar.14, 2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-analysis/equity-or-efficiency 
-battle-soul-benefit-cost-analysis. 
 87. Sometimes this welfare function is interpreted as describing a social planner’s welfare. For an 
example of economists who prefer that CBA measure social welfare, and who criticize efficiency for 
distributional reasons, see Mark Moore & Aidan Vining, The Social Rate of Time Preference and the 
Social Discount Rate, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/moore_and_vining_-_mercatus_research_-
_a_social_rate_of_time_preference_approach_to_social_discount_rate_-_v1.pdf. 
 88. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 60 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 89. Such as the assumption that no single individual is allowed to be a dictator whose preferences 
are always satisfied. See Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351 
(1999). 
 90. See Allan M. Feldman, A Very Unsubtle Version of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 12 J. W. 
ECON. ASS’N 534, 546 (1974) (providing an intuitive explanation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem). 
 91. See Sen, supra note 89, at 354. (addressing this topic). 
 92. Indeed, some researchers try to do just this. See MATTHEW ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2012). 
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fare function might be obtainable. But no credible, agreed-upon method of map-
ping in this way exists,93 which is one reason why Kaldor–Hicks efficiency has 
enjoyed longstanding support among economists.94 
Kaldor’s and Hicks’s approach emerged in response to a particular problem: 
how should economists deal with interpersonal comparisons of utility?95 If two 
people each receive one dollar’s worth of goods, but one is rich and one is poor, 
who is made better off in terms of utility? The answer that Kaldor, Hicks, and 
other economists such as Lionel Robbins settled upon was that economists should 
avoid getting entangled in debates about the desirability of particular distributions 
of wealth.96 Economists are well-positioned to make assessments as to whether the 
overall economic pie has increased or decreased. Their expertise can also provide 
insights into whether a particular policy is likely to lead to a specified end result. 
These assessments involve positive analysis. However, Kaldor, Hicks, Robbins, 
and others believed economists should avoid making interpersonal comparisons of 
utility that involve normative judgments about how the economic pie should be 
distributed.97 These are matters on which economists have no particular expertise. 
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, therefore, is indifferent to the distributional out-
comes of policy. In efficiency analysis, the net benefits calculation identifies 
whether total wealth increases from a policy change, irrespective of its distribu-
tion, and the analyst need not make any particular claims as to whether overall 
social welfare has increased.98 It should therefore be obvious that treating a unit of 
consumption as if it provides differing amounts of utility, depending on who re-
ceives it, is inconsistent with efficiency.99 But this is precisely what economists do 
when they engage in the practice of discounting. A social discount rate places 
unequal weights on consumption based on the assumption that a unit of consump-
tion will provide differing amounts of utility depending on when it is delivered in 
time.100 Discounting in this manner makes interpersonal comparisons of utility and 
                                                          
 93. See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Who’s Your Daddy? 7 J. OF COST BENEFIT-ANALYSIS 
107, 114 (2016) (discussing the current inability to map consumption to utilities in a satisfactory man-
ner). 
 94. See John Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
395, 411 (2008) (giving a history of how Kaldor-Hicks reasoning came to be so accepted by econo-
mists). 
 95. See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, ECON. J. 635, 635 
(1938); Kaldor, supra note 85; Hicks, supra note 85. 
 96. Hicks, supra note 85, at 711. 
 97. Id. at 711–12. 
 98. See David Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost–Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics 
Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 154 (2015) (pointing out that “Maximiz-
ing efficiency is not the same as maximizing welfare,” and stating that efficiency is based on distribu-
tionally unweighted benefits and costs). 
 99. Note that efficiency in the Kaldor–Hicks sense, which is how the term is used here, is different 
from efficiency in the Pareto sense, which is a situation in which no one can be made better off without 
making at least one other person worse off. Kaldor–Hicks improvements are sometimes referred to as 
“potential Pareto improvements” because if compensation from winners to losers took place, efficient 
projects would result in at least one person being made better off without making anyone else worse 
off, i.e., a Pareto improvement. While Pareto improvements are generally more desirable, virtually all 
policies create some losers, so judging policies on the basis of whether they are Kaldor–Hicks im-
provements has proved more practical, as compensation is usually unrealistic. See D. Bruce Johnsen, A 
Coasian Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 490, 512 (2018). 
 100. The standard rationales put forth by economists for weighting consumption in this way are 
that society values future utility less than present utility owing to impatience, i.e., “pure time prefer-
ence,” and that future consumption provides less utility than present consumption because society is 
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violates the assumption that analysis is indifferent with respect to the distribution 
of wealth, and is therefore inconsistent with efficiency in the Kaldor–Hicks sense. 
Curiously, those economists who say they want CBA to measure efficiency do not 
seem to mean it, because they insist on the practice of discounting consumption in 
CBA.101 Their stated and revealed preferences diverge.102 
Some might argue that these problems involving welfare measures are not so 
important. For example, despite economists not agreeing on what CBA measures, 
perhaps the different approaches are not so different from one another in their 
recommendations. This view is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is not clear what 
CBA measures. Even if standard approaches produce similar recommendations, 
they may not measure anything meaningful,103 in which case an entirely different 
approach is needed. Second, since standard methods do not actually measure Kal-
dor–Hicks efficiency, the most obvious alternative to present practices is to meas-
ure efficiency, which many economists already support. Unfortunately, such an 
approach is likely to lead to dramatically different policy recommendations com-
pared with present approaches, because a steadfast commitment to wealth maxi-
mization, combined with distributional indifference, would mean a commitment to 
pursuing capital accumulation and economic growth above all other considera-
tions.104 
Whether or not economists are willing to tackle these challenges is unclear. 
On the one hand, revisiting the foundations of CBA might mean admitting that 
decades of academic research have led economists down a dead-end street. On the 
other hand, if economists do not revisit these issues, the prospects for CBA look 
dim because the credibility of CBA, as well as any policies based on it, is in 
doubt. This article is a call for such reconsideration by economists. 
V. PROCEDURAL REFORMS MIGHT RESULT IN HIGHER-QUALITY 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Given the problems with CBA outlined above, one might wonder whether 
there is any value in producing CBA at all. However, there are several reasons to 
believe CBA is not worth abandoning just yet. First, CBA’s foundations could be 
firmed up relatively easily by simply measuring efficiency rather than some vague 
undefined notion of social welfare or distributive justice. Second, it is unclear 
what an alternative to CBA would be. 
                                                          
expected to be wealthier in the future. These are rationales for discounting under the conventional 
Ramsey approach to discounting. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, ENG’G AND MED., VALUING 
CLIMATE DAMAGES: UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON DIOXIDE 162–163 
(2017). 
 101. See James Broughel, Three Approaches to the Social Discount Rate: The Unsettled Matter of 
Discounting the Future, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/unsettled-matter-discounting-future. 
 102. On the mental disconnect between what economists say and what they do, see James Broughel, 
Even Economists Lie to Themselves, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (July 11, 2019). 
https://fee.org/articles/even-economists-lie-to-themselves/. 
 103. James Broughel, Make Benefit-Cost Analysis Meaningful, REG. REV. (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/01/07/broughel-make-benefit-cost-analysis-meaningful/. 
 104. See Tyler Cowen, Policy Implications of Zero Discounting: An Exploration in Politics & Moral-
ity, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 121, 127–30 (2004). 
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The problems with CBA identified in Part IV are damning in one way: they 
give reason to believe that the institutions that govern the federal regulatory pro-
cess do not work well and that the academic process has problems as well. Other-
wise, how could these issues have been allowed to persist unresolved for so long? 
This suggests that perhaps the states and territories should experiment with differ-
ent regulatory regimes than those that currently exist at the federal level. 
CBA is still relatively rare in the states, so questionable CBA practices may 
not yet be entrenched in state governments the way they are in Washington, D.C. 
or in academia. Obviously, academic economists must play an important role in 
reshaping the CBA of the future. But perhaps institutional experimentation, in-
cluding experimentation with welfare measures, could help improve the quality of 
regulatory analysis and, more importantly, make CBA useful for practical policy 
decisions. In addition to states, so-called independent agencies in Washington, 
D.C., which have traditionally been exempt from many CBA requirements, could 
be well-positioned to experiment along similar lines. 
Several examples in the states offer a glimpse of what improvements in the 
regulatory analysis and review process might look like. One example comes from 
New Hampshire, which requires a “fiscal impact statement” for proposed regula-
tions.105 Notably, this analysis is supposed to capture more than just the budgetary 
impacts of rules to the state government. It must also include “a narrative stating 
the costs and benefits to the citizens of the state and to the political subdivisions of 
the intended action.”106 This model is noteworthy in that the analysis is produced 
by the legislative budget assistant in the legislature,107 not by the agencies that 
regulate (although the two often work together to construct the final analysis). 
This process helps address the issue—commonly found in federal regulatory anal-
yses—that analysis is produced to reach a predetermined conclusion or to defend a 
regulation, as opposed to honestly assess the outcomes of the regulation.108 Regu-
latory agencies are run by political personnel who come into office with agendas 
and may pressure analysts to bend analysis to support policy objectives.109 Thus, 
analytical independence from these political forces is important. 
The New Hampshire process requires review by the Joint Legislative Com-
mittee on Administrative Rules (“JLCAR”), including a review of analysis.110 
Thus, both the production of analysis and its review take place in the legislative 
branch, away from the political influence of the governor and his administration. 
By contrast, at the federal level, both production and review of analysis take place 
                                                          
 105. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:5. 
 106. Id. at § 541-A:5(IV)(a). 
 107. Id. at § 541-A:5(I). 
 108. This is why regulatory analyses are commonly referred to as “advocacy documents.” See E. 
Donald Elliott, Rationing Analysis of Job Losses and Gains: An Exercise in Domestic Comparative 
Law, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 256, 265 (Cary Coglianese et al. ed., 2014); Christopher Carri-
gan & Stuart Shapiro, What’s Wrong with the Back of the Envelope? A Call for Simple (and Timely) 
Benefit–Cost Analysis, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 203, 203 (2017). 
 109. See Carol Davenport & Eric Lipton, Scott Pruitt Is Carrying Out His E.P.A. Agenda in Secret, 
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017); STUART SHAPIRO, ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
SUCCESSES, FAILURES, AND DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 44 (2016); Richard Williams, The Influence of 
Regulatory Economists in Federal Health and Safety Agencies (Working Paper, MERCATUS CTR. AT 
GEORGE MASON UNIV., Jul. 2008), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/influence-
regulatory-economists-federal-health-and-safety-agencies. 
 110. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §541-A:2; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §541-A:13(IV)(d). 
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in the executive branch.111 This is not to say New Hampshire’s process works 
perfectly. The reviews by the JLCAR seem to focus mostly on legal criteria rather 
than on economic impacts, and legislatures are also political, of course. Nonethe-
less, the New Hampshire model is one that is well worth considering. 
Another possible best practice comes from Wisconsin, where legislators can 
request an alternative CBA, distinct from one produced by the regulatory agency, 
to be commissioned (from an outside consulting firm, for example).112 This raises 
the possibility of competing analyses. Notably, if the total implementation and 
compliance costs estimated in a second analysis vary from the agency’s original 
estimate by 15% or more, the cost of the CBA is then charged to the agency’s 
budget. 113 This provides a financial incentive for agencies to be accurate and hon-
est up front. Having legislators request the CBA also changes incentives from 
what they might be if firms were contracted by a regulatory agency directly.114 
Taken together, New Hampshire and Wisconsin raise interesting questions 
about whether independent production of analysis and third-party review of analy-
sis from outside the executive branch are potential improvements to administrative 
procedures that would result in higher-quality, more credible, and more useful 
analysis. There is no guarantee such reforms would bring about better CBA, espe-
cially without shoring up CBA’s theoretical foundations. Nonetheless, these ex-
periments are notable and worth thinking about carefully. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the federal government has been experimenting with innovative re-
forms in recent years (including a regulatory budget), the states have been more 
aggressive regarding setting up procedures for reviewing old regulations, estab-
lishing budget infrastructure for regulations, and setting benchmarks for reducing 
red tape. Virginia and Idaho in particular appear to be models that other states 
should look to for inspiration, and other states may be close behind. Given years 
of slow growth in the United States, coinciding with steady regulatory accumula-
tion, these efforts are a welcome development. 
Going forward, CBA should be the next top priority for reformers. The lack 
of a coherent welfare measure underlying CBA in particular is the most troubling 
aspect of modern CBA. This is not to say that CBA should be abandoned—far 
from it. In fact, committing CBA to the measurement of allocative efficiency is a 
practical way forward that would almost certainly pave the way for vast improve-
ments in evidence-based policy.  
The states are far behind the federal government when it comes to adopting 
CBA for regulations, but this may well prove to be a feature rather than a bug. The 
states can learn from the many missed opportunities at the federal level, perhaps 
by establishing independent production and review of analysis outside the execu-
tive branch, as well as setting clearer standards for what CBA should look like and 
what it should measure. Such experimentation in the laboratories of democracy 
                                                          
 111. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 112. WIS. STAT. § 227.137(4m). 
 113. Id. at § 227.137(4m)(b)(2)(a). 
 114. For example, if an agency wants its actions portrayed in the best light possible, and contractors 
know this, those contractors who want recurring work from an agency can be expected to give agen-
cies the answers they want. 
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may prove to be the best hope for ushering in the next critical wave of U.S. regu-
latory reform. Although the challenges associated with regulatory reform are 
great, they are not insurmountable. The lessons learned from the previous waves 
of reform are many, and if those lessons are heeded, the next wave may prove to 
be the most successful of all. 
18
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss2/3
